2 Definitions: Interactive Proofs and Argument Systems

Throughout these notes, boldface will be used for vectors, to distinguish them from scalars. The notation $\tilde{O}(\cdot)$ hides polylogarithmic factors. So, for example, $n\log^4 n = \tilde{O}(n)$.

2.1 Interactive Proofs

Definition 2.1. Given a function f mapping $\{0,1\}^n$ to a finite range $\mathcal{R}$, an *interactive proof system* for f consists of a probabilistic polynomial time verifier $\mathcal{V}$ and a prover $\mathcal{P}$ who are given a common input $\mathbf{x} \in \{0,1\}^n$. $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{V}$ exchange a sequence of messages to produce a transcript $\mathbf{t} = (\mathcal{V}(\mathbf{r}), \mathcal{P})(\mathbf{x})$, where $\mathbf{r}$ denotes $\mathcal{V}$'s internal randomness. After the transcript $\mathbf{t}$ is produced, $\mathcal{V}$ must output value in $\mathcal{R} \cup \{\perp\}$, where $\perp$ is a special "rejection" symbol indicating that $\mathcal{V}$ rejects $\mathcal{P}$'s claims as invalid. Denote by $\text{out}(\mathcal{V}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{r}, \mathcal{P})$ the output of verifier $\mathcal{V}$ on input $\mathbf{x}$ given prover strategy $\mathcal{P}$ and that $\mathcal{V}$'s internal randomness is equal to $\mathbf{r}$.

The interactive proof system has completeness error δ_c and soundness error δ_s if the following two properties hold.

1. *(Completeness)* There exists a prover strategy $\mathcal{P}$ such that for every $\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{L}$,

$$\Pr[\text{out}(\mathcal{V}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{r}, \mathcal{P}) = f(\mathbf{x})] \geq 1 - \delta_c.$$

2. *(Soundness)* For every $\mathbf{x} \notin \mathcal{L}$ and every prover strategy $\mathcal{P}'$,

$$\Pr[\text{out}(\mathcal{V}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{r}, \mathcal{P}') \notin f(\mathbf{x}), \{\perp\}] \leq \delta_s.$$

An interactive proof system is valid if $\delta_c, \delta_s \leq 1/3$. The complexity class **IP** is the class of all languages possessing valid interactive proof systems.

Intuitively, for any input $\mathbf{x}$, the completeness condition requires that there be a convincing proof for what is the value of f at $\mathbf{x}$. The soundness condition requires that false statements of the form "$f(\mathbf{x}) = z$" for any $z \neq f(\mathbf{x})$ lack a convincing proof.

Several additional clarifying remarks are in order.

- All of the interactive proofs that we will see in this course actually satisfy *perfect* completeness, meaning that $\delta_c = 0$. That is, the honest prover will *always* convince the verifier that it is honest.
- Regarding the requirement that $\delta_s \leq 1/3$, the constant $1/3$ is chosen by convention. In all of the interactive proofs that we see in this course, the soundness error will always be proportional to $1/|\mathbb{F}|$, where $\mathbb{F}$ is the field over which the interactive proof is defined. In practice, $1/|\mathbb{F}|$ be astronomically small (e.g. smaller than, say, 2^{-60}).
- We highlight the fact that the soundness requirement in Definition 2.1 is required to hold even against computationally unbounded provers P', who might be devoting enormous computational resources to trying to trick $\mathcal{V}$ into outputting an incorrect answer.
- Observe that Definition 2.1 implicitly assumes that the total number of messages exchanged by $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{V}$ is $\text{poly}(n)$, as the definition requires that $\mathcal{V}$ run in $\text{poly}(n)$ time over the entire course of the interaction (if the number of messages were superpolynomial in n, then $\mathcal{V}$ could not even read all of the messages in $\text{poly}(n)$ time).

- We clarify that in an interactive proof system, $\mathcal{V}$'s randomness is internal, and in particular is not visible to the prover.

The two costs of paramount importance in any interactive proof are $\mathcal{P}$'s runtime and $\mathcal{V}$'s runtime, but there are other important costs as well: $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{V}$'s space usage, the total number of bits communicated, and the total number of messages exchanged. If $\mathcal{V}$ and $\mathcal{P}$ exchange at most m messages for every pair $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{r})$, then $\lceil m/2 \rceil$ is referred to as the *round complexity* of the interactive proof system.

Robustness of the Model. The key to the power of interactive proofs is the combination of randomness and interaction. If no interaction is allowed, but the verifier is allowed to toss random coins and accept an incorrect proof with small probability, the resulting complexity class is known as **MA**. This class is widely believed to be equal to **NP**, a much smaller class than **PSPACE** = **IP**. Meanwhile, if no randomness is allowed (equivalently, if perfect soundness is required), then the resulting complexity class is once again **IP**.

However, as long as we allow both randomness and interaction, the interactive proofs model is robust to a wide variety of tweaks to the definition.

- (Public Coins vs. Private Coins). Interactive proofs were introduced in 1985 by Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff [GMR89]. At the same conference, Babai [Bab85] independently introduced the Arthur-Merlin class hierarchy, which captures constant-round interactive proof systems, with the additional requirement that the verifier's randomness is public—that is, visible to the prover. Goldwasser and Sipser [GS86] subsequently proved that the distinction between public and private coins is not crucial: any constant-round private coin interactive proof system can be simulated by a constant-round public coin system (with a polynomial blowup in costs).

- (2 Rounds vs. $O(1)$ Rounds). Babai and Moran showed that any constant-round interactive proof can be simulated by a 2-message interactive proof with a polynomial blowup in costs [Bab85, BM88].

- (Perfect vs. Imperfect Completeness). Goldwasser and Sipser [GS86] also showed that any interactive proof with imperfect completeness can be simulated by an interactive proof with perfect completeness.

On Interactive Proofs for Languages Versus Functions. A *language* $\mathcal{L} \subseteq \{0,1\}^*$ is any subset of Boolean strings (here, $\{0,1\}^*$ denotes the set of all finite Boolean strings). In an interactive proof for $\mathcal{L}$, the verifier $\mathcal{V}$ interacts with a prover $\mathcal{P}$ in exactly the same manner as in Definition , and at the end of the interaction, $\mathcal{V}$ must either output "accept" or "reject". The requirements are:

- **Completeness**. For any $\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{L}$, there is some prover strategy will cause the verifier to accept with high probability.

- **Soundness**. For any $x \notin \mathcal{L}$, then for *every* prover strategy, the verifier outputs reject with high probability.

Note in particular that, for $\mathbf{x} \notin \mathcal{L}$, it is *not* required that there to a "convincing proof" of the fact that $f_{\mathcal{L}}(\mathbf{x}) = 0$. The reasoning behind this formalization of interactive proofs for languages is as follows. One thinks of inputs in the language as *true statements*, and inputs not in the language as *false statements*. The above completeness and soundness properties require that all true statements have convincing proofs, and all false statements do not have convincing proofs. It is *not* required that false statements have convincing refutations (i.e., convincing proofs of their falsity).

In contrast, Definition 2.1 (which defines an interactive proof system for a *function* f) requires that for *any* $\mathbf{x}$, there is a convincing proof of the value of $f(\mathbf{x})$. The notions of interactive proofs for languages and functions are, however, related in the following sense: given a *function* f, an interactive proof for f is equivalent to an interactive proof for the *language* $\mathcal{L}_f := \{(\mathbf{x}, y) : y = f(\mathbf{x})\}$.

In these lecture notes, we will primarily be concerned with interactive proofs for functions instead of languages (we only talk about interactive proofs for languages when referring to complexity classes such as **IP**, defined in the next subsection).

2.1.1 NP and IP

Let **IP** be the class of all languages solvable by an interactive proof system (with a polynomial time verifier). The class **IP** can be viewed as an interactive, randomized variant of the classical complexity class **NP** (**NP** is the class obtained by restricting the proof system to be non-interactive and deterministic, meaning that the completeness and soundness errors are 0).

We will see soon that the class **IP** is in fact equal to **PSPACE**, the class of all languages solvable by algorithms using polynomial space (and possibly exponential time). **PSPACE** is believed to be a vastly bigger class of languages than **NP**, so this is one formalization of the statement that "interactive proofs are far more powerful than classical static (i.e, **NP**) proofs".

Interestingly, *both* ingredients (interaction and randomness) seem necessary to make the resulting proof systems substantially more powerful than static proofs. In particular, if we allow proof systems to be interactive but not randomized, then the class of languages solvable by such proof systems with polynomial time verifiers is still just **NP** (showing this may be a question on the first problem set). And if we allow proof systems to be randomized by not interactive, then the class of languages solvable by such proof systems with polynomial time verifiers is called **MA** (short for Merlin-Arthur). Many people believe that **MA** = **NP**; that is, it is suspected that allowing randomness but not interaction in proof systems does not endow them with significantly more power than deterministic static proofs.

2.1.2 Argument Systems

Definition 2.2. An *argument system* for a language $\mathcal{L} \subseteq \{0,1\}^*$ is an interactive proof for $\mathcal{L}$, in which the soundness condition is only required to hold against prover strategies that run in polynomial time.

Argument systems were introduced by Brassard, Chaum, and Crépeau in 1986 [BCC88]. Unlike interactive proofs, argument systems are able to utilize cryptographic primitives. While a super-polynomial time prover may be able to break the primitive and thereby trick the verifier into accepting an incorrect answer, a polynomial time prover will be unable to break the primitive. The use of cryptography often allows argument systems to achieve additional desirable properties that are unattainable for interactive proofs, such as reusability (i.e., the ability for the verifier to reuse the same "secret state" to outsource many computations on the same input), zero-knowledge, public verifiability, etc. These properties will be discussed in more detail later in this survey.

2.2 Schwartz-Zippel Lemma

2.2.1 Terminolgy

For an m-variate polynomial g, the degree of a term of g is the sum of the exponents of the variables in the term. For example if $g(x_1, x_2) = 7x_1^2x_2 + 6x_2^4$, then the degree of the term $7x_1^2x_2$ is 3, and the degree of the

term $6x_2^4$ is 4. The total degree of g is the maximum of the degree of any term of g.

2.2.2 The Lemma Itself

Interactive proofs frequently exploit the following basic property of polynomials, which is commonly known as the Schwartz-Zippel lemma [Sch80, Zip79].

Lemma 2.3 (Schwartz-Zippel Lemma)**.** *Let $\mathbb{F}$ be any field, and let $g : \mathbb{F}^m \to \mathbb{F}$ be a nonzero polynomial of total degree at most d. Then on any finite set $S \subseteq \mathbb{F}$,*

$$\Pr_{\mathbf{x} \leftarrow S^m}[g(\mathbf{x}) = 0] \leq d/|S|.$$

In words, if $\mathbf{x}$ is chosen uniformly at random from S^m, then the probability that $g(\mathbf{x}) = 0$ is at most $d/|S|$. In particular, any two distinct polynomials of total degree at most d can agree on at most $d/|S|$ fraction of points in S^m.

We will not prove the lemma above, but it is easy to find a proof online (see, e.g., the wikipedia article on the lemma). An easy implication of the Schwartz-Zippel lemma is that for any two distinct m-variate polynomials p and q of total degree at most d over $\mathbb{F}$, $p(\mathbf{x}) = q(\mathbf{x})$ for at most a $d/|\mathbb{F}|$ fraction of inputs. The lecture on Reed-Solomon fingerprinting exploited precisely this implication in the special case of univariate polynomials (i.e., $m = 1$).

2.3 Low Degree and Multilinear Extensions

Let $\mathbb{F}$ be any finite field, and let $f\colon \{0,1\}^v \to \mathbb{F}$ be any function mapping the v-dimensional Boolean hypercube to $\mathbb{F}$. A v-variate polynomial g over $\mathbb{F}$ is said to be an *extension* of f if g agrees with f at all Boolean-valued inputs, i.e., $g(\mathbf{x}) = f(\mathbf{x})$ for all $\mathbf{x} \in \{0,1\}^v$.[2]

Preview: Why low-degree extensions are useful. One can think of a (low-degree) extension g of f as an error-corrected (or, at least, *distance-amplifying*) encoding of f in the following sense: if two Boolean functions f, f' disagree at even a single input, then any degree d extensions g, g' must differ *almost everywhere* (assuming $d \ll |\mathbb{F}|$). This is made precise by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma above, which guarantees that g and g' agree on at most $d/|\mathbb{F}|$ fraction of points in $\mathbb{F}^v$. As we will see in the next subsection, these error-correcting properties give the verifier surprising power over the prover. □

Definition 2.4. A multivariate polynomial g is *multilinear* if the degree of the polynomial in each variable is at most one.

For example, the polynomial $g(x_1, x_2) = x_1x_2 + 4x_1 + 3x_2$ is multilinear, but the polynomial $h(x_1, x_2) = x_2^2 + 4x_1 + 3x_2$ is not.

Throughout this course, we will frequently use the following fact.

Fact 2.5. *Any function $f\colon \{0,1\}^v \to \{0,1\}$ has a unique* multilinear *extension (MLE) over $\mathbb{F}$, and we reserve the notation $\widetilde{f}$ for this special extension of f.*

That is, $\widetilde{f}$, is the unique multilinear polynomial over $\mathbb{F}$ satisfying $\widetilde{f}(x) = f(x)$ for all $x \in \{0,1\}^v$. See Figure 3 for an example of a function and its multilinear extension.

MLEs have a particularly simple representation, given by Lagrange interpolation:

[2] Later in this course, we will consider extensions of functions $f\colon \{0,\ldots,M-1\}^v \to \mathbb{F}$ with $M > 1$. In this case, we say that $g\colon \mathbb{F}^v \to \mathbb{F}$ extends f if $g(\mathbf{x}) = f(\mathbf{x})$ for all $\mathbf{x} \in \{0,\ldots,M-1\}^v$. Here, we interpret each number in $\{0,\ldots,M-1\}$ as elements of $\mathbb{F}$ via any efficiently computable injection from $\{0,\ldots,M-1\}$ to $\mathbb{F}$.

	0	1
0	1	2
1	1	4

Figure 2: A function f mapping $\{0,1\}^2$ to the field $\mathbb{F}_5$.

	0	1	2	3	4
0	1	2	3	4	5
1	1	4	2	0	3
2	1	1	1	1	1
3	1	3	0	2	4
4	1	0	4	3	2

Figure 3: The multilinear extension, $\widetilde{f}$ of f over $\mathbb{F}_5$.

Lemma 2.6. *Let $f\colon \{0,1\}^v \to \mathbb{F}$ be any function. Then, as formal polynomials,*

$$\widetilde{f}(x_1,\ldots,x_v) = \sum_{\mathbf{w}\in\{0,1\}^v} f(\mathbf{w})\cdot\chi_{\mathbf{w}}(x_1,\ldots,x_v), \tag{1}$$

where, for any $\mathbf{w} = (w_1,\ldots,w_v)$,

$$\chi_{\mathbf{w}}(x_1,\ldots,x_v) := \prod_{i=1}^{v}(x_i w_i + (1-x_i)(1-w_i)). \tag{2}$$

Proof. For any vector $\mathbf{w}\in\{0,1\}^v$, $\chi_{\mathbf{w}}$ is the unique multilinear polynomial satisfying: $\chi_{\mathbf{w}}(\mathbf{w}) = 0$, and $\chi_{\mathbf{w}}(\mathbf{y}) = 0$ for all other vectors $\mathbf{y}\in\{0,1\}^v$. Clearly the right hand side of Equation (1) is a multilinear polynomial in $(x_1,\ldots,x_v)$, so in order to show that it is equal to the unique MLE of f, we need only show that $\sum_{\mathbf{w}\in\{0,1\}^v} f(\mathbf{w})\cdot\chi_{\mathbf{w}}(\mathbf{y}) = f(\mathbf{y})$ for all *Boolean* vectors $\mathbf{y}\in\{0,1\}^v$; this is immediate from the previous sentence. □

Suppose that the verifier is given as input the values $f(\mathbf{w})$ for all $n = 2^v$ Boolean vectors $\mathbf{w}\in\{0,1\}^v$. Equation (1) yields two efficient methods for evaluating $\widetilde{f}$ at any point $\mathbf{r}\in\mathbb{F}^v$, The first method was described in [CTY10]: it requires $O(n\log n)$ time, and allows $\mathcal{V}$ to make a single streaming pass over the $f(\mathbf{w})$ values while using $v+1 = O(\log n)$ words of space. The second method is due to Vu et al. [VSBW13]: it shaves a logarithmic factor off of $\mathcal{V}$'s runtime, bringing it down to linear time, i.e., $O(n)$, but increases $\mathcal{V}$'s space usage to $O(n)$.

Lemma 2.7 ([CTY10])**.** *Fix a positive integer v and let $n = 2^v$. Given as input $f(\mathbf{w})$ for all $\mathbf{w}\in\{0,1\}^v$ and a vector $\mathbf{r}\in\mathbb{F}^{\log n}$, $\mathcal{V}$ can compute $\widetilde{f}(\mathbf{r})$ in $O(n\log n)$ time and $O(\log n)$ words of space with a single streaming pass over the input (regardless of the order in which the $f(\mathbf{w})$ value are presented).*

Proof. $\mathcal{V}$ can compute the right hand side of Equation (1) incrementally from the stream by initializing $\widetilde{f}(\mathbf{r}) \leftarrow 0$, and processing each update $(\mathbf{w}, f(\mathbf{w}))$ via:

$$\widetilde{f}(\mathbf{r}) \leftarrow \widetilde{f}(\mathbf{r}) + f(\mathbf{w})\cdot\chi_{\mathbf{w}}(\mathbf{r}).$$

$\mathcal{V}$ only needs to store $\widetilde{f}(\mathbf{r})$ and $\mathbf{r}$, which requires $O(\log n)$ words of memory (one for each entry of $\mathbf{r}$). Moreover, for any $\mathbf{w}$, $\chi_{\mathbf{w}}(\mathbf{r})$ can be computed in $O(\log n)$ field operations (see Equation (2)), and thus $\mathcal{V}$ can compute $\widetilde{f}(\mathbf{r})$ with one pass over the stream, using $O(\log n)$ words of space and $O(\log n)$ field operations per update. □

Lemma 2.8 ([VSBW13])**.** *Fix a postive integer v, and let $n = 2^v$. Given as input $f(\mathbf{w})$ for all $\mathbf{w} \in \{0,1\}^v$ and a vector $\mathbf{r} = (r_1, \ldots, r_v) \in \mathbb{F}^{\log n}$, $\mathcal{V}$ can compute $\widetilde{f}(\mathbf{r})$ in $O(n)$ time and $O(n)$ space.*

Proof. Notice the right hand side of Equation (1) expresses $\widetilde{f}(\mathbf{r})$ as the inner product of two n-dimensional vectors, where the $\mathbf{w}$'th entry of the first vector is $f(\mathbf{w})$ and the $\mathbf{w}$th entry of the second vector is $\chi_{\mathbf{w}}(\mathbf{r})$. This inner product can be computed in $O(n)$ time given a table of size n whose $\mathbf{w}$th entry contains the quantity $\chi_{\mathbf{w}}(\mathbf{r})$. Vu et al. show how to build such a table in time $O(n)$ using memoization.

The memoization procedure consists of $v = \log n$ stages, where Stage j constructs a table $A^{(j)}$ of size 2^j, such that for any $(w_1, \ldots, w_j) \in \{0,1\}^j$, $A^{(j)}[(w_1, \ldots, w_j)] = \prod_{i=1}^{j} \chi_{w_i}(r_i)$. Notice $A^{(j)}[(w_1, \ldots, w_j)] = A^{(j-1)}[(w_1, \ldots, w_{j-1})] \cdot (w_j r_j + (1 - w_j)(1 - r_j))$, and so the jth stage of the memoization procedure requires time $O(2^j)$. The total time across all $\log n$ stages is therefore $O(\sum_{j=1}^{\log n} 2^j) = O(2^{\log n}) = O(n)$. □

2.4 Sum-Check Protocol

Suppose we are given a v-variate polynomial g defined over a finite field $\mathbb{F}$. The purpose of the sum-check protocol [LFKN92] is to compute the sum:

$$H := \sum_{b_1 \in \{0,1\}} \sum_{b_2 \in \{0,1\}} \cdots \sum_{b_v \in \{0,1\}} g(b_1, \ldots, b_v).$$

In applications, this sum will often be over a very large number of terms, so the verifier may not have the resources to compute the sum without help. Instead, she uses the sum-check protocol to force the prover to compute the sum for her.

Remark 1. In full generality, the sum-check protocol can compute the sum $\sum_{\mathbf{b} \in B^m} g(\mathbf{b})$ for any $B \subseteq \mathbb{F}$, but most of the applications covered in this survey will only require $B = \{0,1\}$.

For presentation purposes, we assume here that the verifier has oracle access to g, i.e., $\mathcal{V}$ can evaluate $g(r_1, \ldots, r_v)$ for a randomly chosen vector $(r_1, \ldots, r_v) \in \mathbb{F}^v$ with a single query to an oracle, though this will not be the case in applications. In our applications, $\mathcal{V}$ will either be able to efficiently evaluate $g(r_1, \ldots, r_v)$ unaided, or if this is not the case, $\mathcal{V}$ will ask the prover to *tell her* $g(r_1, \ldots, r_v)$, and $\mathcal{P}$ will subsequently prove this claim is correct via further applications of the sum-check protocol.

The protocol proceeds in v rounds. In the first round, the prover sends a polynomial $g_1(X_1)$, and claims that $g_1(X_1) = \sum_{(x_2, \ldots, x_v) \in \{0,1\}^{v-1}} g(X_1, x_2, \ldots, x_v)$. If g_1 is as claimed, then $H = g_1(0) + g_1(1)$.

Throughout, let $\deg_i(p)$ denote the degree of variable i in variable p. The polynomial $g_1(X_1)$ has degree $\deg_1(g)$. Hence g_1 can be specified with $\deg_1(g) + 1$ field elements, for example by sending the evaluation of g_1 at each point in the set $\{0, 1, \ldots, \deg_1(g)\}$.

Then, in round $j > 1$, $\mathcal{V}$ chooses a value r_{j-1} uniformly at random from $\mathbb{F}$ and sends r_{j-1} to $\mathcal{P}$. We refer to this step by saying that variable $j - 1$ gets *bound* to value r_{j-1}. In return, the prover sends a polynomial $g_j(X_j)$, and claims that

$$g_j(X_j) = \sum_{(x_{j+1}, \ldots, x_v) \in \{0,1\}^{v-j}} g(r_1, \ldots, r_{j-1}, X_j, x_{j+1}, \ldots, x_v). \tag{3}$$

The verifier compares the two most recent polynomials by checking $g_{j-1}(r_{j-1}) = g_j(0) + g_j(1)$, and rejecting otherwise. The verifier also rejects if the degree of g_j is too high: each g_j should have degree $\deg_j(g)$, the degree of variable x_j in g.

In the final round, the prover has sent $g_v(X_v)$ which is claimed to be $g(r_1, \ldots, r_{v-1}, X_v)$. $\mathcal{V}$ now checks that $g_v(r_v) = g(r_1, \ldots, r_v)$ (recall that we assumed $\mathcal{V}$ has oracle access to g). If this test succeeds, and so do all previous tests, then the verifier is convinced that $H = g_1(0) + g_1(1)$.

The protocol is summarized below.

Description of Sum-Check Protocol.

- Fix an $H \in \mathbb{F}$.
- In the first round, $\mathcal{P}$ sends the univariate polynomial

$$g_1(X_1) := \sum_{(x_2,\ldots,x_v)\in\{0,1\}^{v-1}} g(X_1, x_2, \ldots, x_v).$$

  $\mathcal{V}$ checks that g_1 is a univariate polynomial of degree at most $\deg_1(g)$, and that $H = g_1(0) + g_1(1)$, rejecting if not.
- $\mathcal{V}$ chooses a random element $r_1 \in \mathbb{F}$, and sends r_1 to $\mathcal{P}$.
- In the jth round, for $1 < j < v$, $\mathcal{P}$ sends to $\mathcal{V}$ the univariate polynomial

$$g_j(X_j) = \sum_{(x_{j+1},\ldots,x_v)\in\{0,1\}^{v-j}} g(r_1, \ldots, r_{j-1}, X_j, x_{j+1}, \ldots, x_v).$$

  $\mathcal{V}$ checks that g_j is a univariate polynomial of degree at most $\deg_j(g)$, and that $g_{j-1}(r_{j-1}) = g_j(0) + g_j(1)$, rejecting if not.
- $\mathcal{V}$ chooses a random element $r_j \in \mathbb{F}$, and sends r_j to $\mathcal{P}$.
- In Round v, $\mathcal{P}$ sends the univariate polynomial

$$g_v(X_v) = g(r_1, \ldots, r_{v-1}, X_v)$$

  to $\mathcal{V}$. $\mathcal{V}$ checks that g_v is a univariate polynomial of degree at most $\deg_v(g)$, rejecting if not.
- $\mathcal{V}$ chooses a random element $r_v \in \mathbb{F}$ and evaluates $g(r_1, \ldots, r_v)$ with a single oracle query to g. $\mathcal{V}$ checks that $g_v(r_v) = g(r_1, \ldots, r_v)$, rejecting if not.
- If $\mathcal{V}$ has not yet rejected, $\mathcal{V}$ halts and accepts.

The following proposition formalizes the completeness and soundness properties of the sum-check protocol.

Proposition 2.9. *Let g be a v-variate polynomial of total degree at most d defined over a finite field $\mathbb{F}$. For any $H \in \mathbb{F}$, let $\mathcal{L}$ be the language of of polynomials g (given as an oracle) such that*

$$H = \sum_{b_1\in\{0,1\}} \sum_{b_2\in\{0,1\}} \cdots \sum_{b_v\in\{0,1\}} g(b_1, \ldots, b_v).$$

The sum-check protocol is an interactive proof system for L with completeness error $\delta_c = 0$ and soundness error $\delta_s \leq vd/|\mathbb{F}|$.

Proof. Completeness is evident: if the prover sends the prescribed polynomial $g_j(X_j)$ at all rounds j, then $\mathcal{V}$ will accept with probability 1.

Communication	Rounds	$\mathcal{V}$ time	$\mathcal{P}$ time
$O(\sum_{i=1}^{v} \deg_i(g)\|)$ field elements	v	at most $O(\sum_{i=1}^{v} \deg_i(g)) + T$	at most $O(2^v \cdot T)$

Table 1: Costs of sum-check protocol when applied to a v-variate polynomial g over $\mathbb{F}$. $\deg_i(g)$ denotes the degree of variable i in g, and T denotes the cost of an oracle query to g.

The proof of soundness is by induction on v. In the case $v = 1$, $\mathcal{P}$'s only message specifies a degree d univariate polynomial $g_1(X_1)$. If $g_1(X_1) \neq g(X_1)$, then by Lemma 2.3, $g_1(r_1) \neq g(r_1)$ with probability at least $1 - d/|\mathbb{F}|$ over the choice of r_1, and hence $\mathcal{V}$'s final check will cause $\mathcal{V}$ to reject with probably at least $1 - d/|\mathbb{F}|$.

Assume by way of induction that for all $v-1$-variate polynomials, the sum-check protocol has soundness error at most $(v-1)d/|\mathbb{F}|$. Let $h_1(X_1) = \sum_{x_2,\ldots,x_v \in \{0,1\}^{v-1}} g(X_1, x_2, \ldots, x_v)$. Suppose $\mathcal{P}$ sends a polynomial $g_1(X_1) \neq h_1(X_1)$ in Round 1. Then by Lemma 2.3, $h_1(r_1) \neq g_1(r_1)$ with probability at least $1 - d/|\mathbb{F}|$. Conditioned on this event, $\mathcal{P}$ is left to prove the false claim in Round 2 that $g_1(r_1) = \sum_{(x_2,\ldots,x_v) \in \{0,1\}^{v-1}} g(r_1, x_2, \ldots, x_v)$. Since $g(r_1, x_2, \ldots, x_v)$ is a $v-1$-variate polynomial of total degree d, the inductive hypothesis implies the $\mathcal{V}$ will reject at some subsequent round of the protocol with probability at least $1 - d(v-1)/|\mathbb{F}|$. Therefore, $\mathcal{V}$ will reject with probability at least

$$1 - \Pr[h_1(r_1) \neq g_1(r_1)] - (1 - \Pr[\mathcal{V} \text{ rejects in some Round } j > 1 | h_1(r_1) \neq g_1(r_1)])$$
$$\geq 1 - \frac{d}{|\mathbb{F}|} - \frac{d(v-1)}{|\mathbb{F}|} = 1 - \frac{dv}{|\mathbb{F}|}.$$

□

Discussion of costs. There is one round in the sum-check protocol for each of the v variables of g. The total communication is $\sum_{i=1}^{v} \deg_i(g) + 1 = v + \sum_{i=1}^{v} \deg_i(g)$ field elements. In particular, if $\deg_i(g) = O(1)$ for all j, then the communication cost is $O(v)$ field elements.

The running time of the verifier over the entire execution of the protocol is proportional to the total communication, plus the cost of a single oracle query to g to compute $g(r_1, \ldots, r_v)$.

Determining the running time of the prover is less straightforward. Recall that $\mathcal{P}$ can specify g_j by sending for each $i \in \{0, \ldots, \deg_j(g)\}$ the value:

$$g_j(i) = \sum_{(x_{j+1},\ldots,x_v) \in \{0,1\}^{v-j}} g(r_1, \ldots, r_{j-1}, i, x_{j+1}, \ldots, x_v). \tag{4}$$

An important insight is that the number of terms defining the value $g_j(i)$ in Equation (4) falls geometrically with j: in the jth sum, there are only 2^{v-j} terms, each corresponding to a Boolean vector in $\{0,1\}^{v-j}$. Thus, the total number of terms that must be evaluated over the course of the protocol is $\sum_{j=1}^{v} \deg_j(g) 2^{v-j} = O(2^v)$ if $\deg_j(g) = O(1)$ for all j. Consequently, if $\mathcal{P}$ is given oracle access to g, then $\mathcal{P}$ will require just $O(2^v)$ time.

In all of the applications covered in this survey, $\mathcal{P}$ will not have oracle access to the truth table of g, and the key to many of the results in this survey is to show that $\mathcal{P}$ can nonetheless evaluate g at all of the necessary points in close to $O(2^v)$ total time.

The costs of the sum-check protocol are summarized in Table 1. Since $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{V}$ will not be given oracle access to g in applications, the table makes the number of oracle queries to g explicit.

Preview: Why multilinear extensions are useful. We will see several scenarios where it is useful to compute $H = \sum_{\mathbf{x} \in \{0,1\}^v} f(\mathbf{x})$ for some function $f\colon \{0,1\}^v \to \mathbb{F}$ derived from the verifier's input. We can compute H by applying the sum-check protocol to any low-degree extension g of f. When $g = \widetilde{f}$, or is derived from $\widetilde{f}$ in some way, then Equation (1) can often be exploited to ensure that enormous cancellations occur in the computation of the prover's messages, allowing fast computation. □

Preview: Why using multilinear extensions is not always possible. Although the use of the MLE $\widetilde{f}$ typically ensures fast computation for the prover, $\widetilde{f}$ cannot be used in all applications. The reason is that the verifier has to be able to evaluate $\widetilde{f}$ at a random point $\mathbf{r} \in \mathbb{F}^v$ to perform the final check in the sum-check protocol, and in some settings, this computation would be too costly.

Equation (1) gives a way for $\mathcal{V}$ to evaluate $\tilde{f}(\mathbf{r})$ in time $\tilde{O}(2^v)$, since it represents $\tilde{f}(\mathbf{r})$ as a sum of 2^v terms. This might or might not be an acceptable runtime, depending on the relationship between v and the verifier's input size n. If $v = \log n + \text{poly}(\log\log n)$, then $\tilde{O}(2^v) = \tilde{O}(n)$, and the verifier runs in quasilinear time. But we will see some applications where $v = c\log n$ for some constant $c > 1$, and others where $v = n$ (cf. the #SAT protocol in the next lecture). In these settings, $\tilde{O}(2^v)$ runtime for the verifier is unacceptable, and we will be forced to use an extension g of f that has a succinct representation, enabling $\mathcal{V}$ to compute $g(\mathbf{r})$ in $o(2^v)$ time. Sometimes $\widetilde{f}$ itself has such a succinct representation, but other times we will be forced to use a higher-degree extension of f. □

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