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#### Talk Outline

- 1. Definition of Interactive Proofs
- 2. The Power of Randomness
  - Reed-Solomon Fingerprinting
  - Freivalds' Protocol for Verifying Matrix Products
- 3. Technical Concepts: low-degree extensions, arithmetization
- 4. The Sum-Check Protocol
- 5. An Interactive Proof for #SAT
- 6. Doubly-Efficient Interactive Proofs

# Interactive Proofs: Motivation and Model



#### Business/Agency/Scientist







#### Business/Agency/Scientist











- Prover **P** and Verifier **V**.
- P solves problem, tells V the answer.
  - Then P and V have a conversation.
  - P's goal: convince V the answer is correct.
- Requirements:
  - 1. Completeness: an honest P can convince V to accept.
  - 2. Soundness: V will catch a lying P with high probability.



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  - 2. Soundness: V will catch a lying P with high probability.
    - This must hold even if P is computationally unbounded and trying to trick V into accepting the incorrect answer.



# The Power of Randomness: A Demonstration



#### $\boldsymbol{a} = (a_1, \dots, a_n) \in \{0, 1\}^n$ $\boldsymbol{b} = (b_1, \dots, b_n) \in \{0, 1\}^n$

Alice and Bob's Goal: Determine whether  $\boldsymbol{a} = \boldsymbol{b}$ , while exchanging as few bits as possible.



Trivial solution: Alice sends  $\boldsymbol{a}$  to Bob, who checks whether  $\boldsymbol{a} = \boldsymbol{b}$ . Communication cost is  $\boldsymbol{n}$ .



Fact: Trivial solution is optimal amongst deterministic protocols.

## A Logarithmic Cost Randomized Solution

- Notation:
  - Let  $\boldsymbol{F}$  be any finite field with  $|\boldsymbol{F}| \ge n^2$ .
  - Interpret each  $a_i$ ,  $b_i$  as elements of F.
  - Let  $p(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i x^i$  and  $q(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} b_i x^i$ .

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    - Bob outputs EQUAL if p(r) = q(r). Otherwise he outputs NOT-EQUAL.

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- Total communication:  $O(\log |F|) = O(\log n)$  bits.
- Call p(r) the *Reed-Solomon fingerprint* of the vector  $\boldsymbol{a}$  at r.

• Claim 1: if a = b, then Bob outputs EQUAL with probability 1.

• Claim 2:  $a \neq b$ , then Bob outputs NOT-EQUAL with probability at least  $1 - \frac{1}{n}$  over the choice of  $r \in F$ .

- Claim 1: if a = b, then Bob outputs EQUAL with probability 1.
  - Proof: Since a = b, p and q are the same polynomial, so p(r) = q(r) for all  $r \in F$ .
- Claim 2:  $\boldsymbol{a} \neq \boldsymbol{b}$ , then Bob outputs NOT-EQUAL with probability at least  $1 \frac{1}{n}$  over the choice of  $r \in \boldsymbol{F}$ .

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**FACT:** Let  $p \neq q$  be univariate polynomials of degree at most n. Then p and q agree on at most n inputs. Equivalently:  $\Pr_{r \in F}[p(r) = q(r)] \leq \frac{n}{|F|}$ .

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• If  $a \neq b$ , then p and q are **not** the same polynomial. By **FACT**, the probability Alice picks an r such that p(r) = q(r) is at most  $\frac{n}{|F|} \leq \frac{n}{n^2} \leq \frac{1}{n}$ .

#### Main Takeaways

- 1. Any two distinct low-degree polynomials differ almost everywhere: if  $p \neq q$  then  $\Pr_{r \in F}[p(r) = q(r)] \leq \frac{n}{|F|}$ where *n* bounds the degree of *p* and *q*.
  - Corollary: If two low-degree polynomials agree at a randomly chosen input, it is "safe" to believe they are the **same** polynomial.
- 2. Interpreting inputs as low-degree polynomials is powerful.
  - If two inputs differ **at all**, then once interpreted as polynomials, they differ **almost everywhere**.

## Freivalds' Protocol for Verifying Matrix Products

# Demonstrating the Power of Randomness in Verifiable Computing

- Input is two matrices  $A, B \in F^{n \times n}$ . Goal is to compute  $A \cdot B$ .
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- Yes!

- The Protocol:
  - 1. V picks a random  $r \in F$  and lets  $x = (r, r^2, ..., r^n)$ .
  - 2. V computes  $C \cdot x$  and (AB)  $\cdot x$ , accepting iff they are equal.

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- 2. V computes  $C \cdot x$  and (AB)  $\cdot x$ , accepting iff they are equal.
- Runtime Analysis:
  - V's runtime dominated by computing 3 matrix-vector products, each of which takes  $O(n^2)$  time.
    - $C \cdot \mathbf{x}$  is one matrix-vector multiplication.
    - (AB)  $\cdot \mathbf{x} = A \cdot (B \cdot \mathbf{x})$  takes two matrix-vector multiplications.

- Claim 1: If  $C = A \cdot B$  then V accepts with probability 1.
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  - Proof of Claim 2:
    - Recall that  $\boldsymbol{x} = (r, r^2, \dots, r^n)$ .
    - $(C \cdot \mathbf{x})_i = \sum_{j=1}^n C_{ij} r^j$  is the Reed-Solomon fingerprint at r of the *i*th row of C.

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### **Correctness Analysis**

- Claim 1: If  $C = A \cdot B$  then V accepts with probability 1.
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  - Proof of Claim 2:
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    - $(C \cdot \mathbf{x})_i = \sum_{j=1}^n C_{ij} r^j$  is the Reed-Solomon fingerprint at r of the *i*th row of C.
    - Similarly,  $((AB) \cdot x)_i$  is the Reed-Solomon fingerprint at r of the *i*th row of AB.
    - So if even one row of C does not equal the corresponding row of AB, the fingerprints for that row will differ with probability at least 1 1/n, causing V to reject.

# Interactive Proof Techniques: Preliminaries

# Schwartz-Zippel Lemma

• Recall **FACT:** Let  $p \neq q$  be univariate polynomials of degree at most d. Then  $\Pr_{r \in F}[p(r) = q(r)] \leq \frac{d}{|F|}$ .

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- The **Schwartz-Zippel lemma** is a multivariate generalization:
  - Let  $p \neq q$  be  $\ell$ -variate polynomials of total degree at most d. Then  $\Pr_{r \in F^{\ell}}[p(r) = q(r)] \leq \frac{d}{|F|}$ .

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  - "Total degree" refers to the maximum sum of degrees of all variables in any term. E.g.,  $x_1^2x_2 + x_1x_2$  has total degree 3.

#### Low-Degree and Multilinear Extensions

- Definition [Extensions]. Given a function  $f: \{0,1\}^{\ell} \to F$ , a  $\ell$ -variate polynomial g over F is said to extend f if f(x) = g(x) for all  $x \in \{0,1\}^{\ell}$ .
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- Definition [Multilinear Extensions]. Any function  $f: \{0,1\}^{\ell} \to F$  has a unique multilinear extension (MLE), denoted  $\tilde{f}$ .
  - Multilinear means the polynomial has degree at most 1 in each variable.
  - $(1 x_1)(1 x_2)$  is multilinear,  $x_1^2 x_2$  is not.

 $f:\{0,1\}^2 \to \mathbf{F}$ 





 $\tilde{f}(x_1, x_2) = (1 - x_1)(1 - x_2) + 2(1 - x_1)x_2 + 8x_1(1 - x_2) + 10x_1x_2$ 





#### Low-Degree and Multilinear Extensions

- Fact [VSBW13]: Given as input all 2<sup>ℓ</sup> evaluations of a function f: {0,1}<sup>ℓ</sup>→ F, for any point r ∈ F<sup>ℓ</sup> there is an O(2<sup>ℓ</sup>)-time algorithm for evaluating f̃(r).
- Note: If f is "structured", there may extensions g for which g(r) can be evaluated **much** faster than  $O(2^{\ell})$ -time.

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- Note: If f is "structured", there may extensions g for which g(r) can be evaluated **much** faster than  $O(2^{\ell})$ -time.
  - We will see an example later when covering arithmetization of Boolean formulae.

# The Sum-Check Protocol [LFKN90]



# Sum-Check Protocol [LFKN90]

- Input: V given oracle access to a  $\ell$ -variate polynomial g over field F.
- Goal: compute the quantity:

$$\sum_{b_1 \in \{0,1\}} \sum_{b_2 \in \{0,1\}} \dots \sum_{b_\ell \in \{0,1\}} g(b_1, \dots, b_\ell).$$

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- If this check passes, it is safe for V to believe that  $C_1$  is the correct answer, so long as V believes that  $s_1 = H_1$ .
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- How to check this? Just check that  $s_1$  and  $H_1$  agree at a random point  $r_1$ !
- V can compute  $S_1(r_1)$  directly from P's first message, but not  $H_1(r_1)$ .

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- Round  $\ell$  (Final round): P sends univariate polynomial  $S_{\ell}(X_{\ell})$  claimed to equal  $H_{\ell} := g(r_1, ..., r_{\ell-1}, X_{\ell}).$
- V checks that  $s_{\ell-1}(r_{\ell-1}) = s_{\ell}(0) + s_{\ell}(1)$ .
- V picks  $r_{\ell}$  at random, and needs to check that  $s_{\ell}(r_{\ell}) = g(r_1, ..., r_{\ell})$ .
  - No need for more rounds. V can perform this check with one oracle query.

# Analysis of the Sum-Check Protocol

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- Proof is by induction on the number of variables  $\ell$ .
  - Base case:  $\ell = 1$ . In this case, P sends a single message  $S_1(X_1)$  claimed to equal  $g(X_1)$ . V picks  $r_1$  at random, checks that  $s_1(r_1) = g(r_1)$ .

• By Fact, if  $s_1 \neq g$ , then  $\Pr_{r_1 \in F}[s_1(r_1) = g(r_1)] \leq \frac{d}{|F|}$ .

- Inductive case:  $\ell > 1$ .
  - Recall: P's first message  $S_1(X_1)$  is claimed to equal

$$H_1(X_1) \coloneqq \sum_{b_2 \in \{0,1\}} \dots \sum_{b_\ell \in \{0,1\}} g(X_1, b_2, \dots, b_\ell).$$

• Then V picks a random  $r_1$  and sends  $r_1$  to P. They (recursively) invoke sumcheck to confirm that  $s_1(r_1) = H_1(r_1)$ .

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- By **Fact**, if  $s_1 \neq H_1$ , then  $\Pr_{r_1 \in F}[s_1(r_1) = H(r_1)] \leq \frac{d}{|F|}$ .

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- If  $s_1(r_1) \neq H(r_1)$ , **P** is left to prove a false claim in the recursive call.
  - The recursive call applies sum-check to  $g(r_1, X_2, ..., X_\ell)$ , which is  $\ell$ -1 variate.
  - By induction, P fails to convince V in the recursive call with probability at least  $1 \frac{d(\ell-1)}{|F|}$ .

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  - The recursive call applies sum-check to  $g(r_1, X_2, ..., X_\ell)$ , which is  $\ell$ -1 variate.
  - By induction, P fails to convince V in the recursive call with probability at least  $1 \frac{d(\ell-1)}{|F|}$ .
- **Summary:** if  $S_1 \neq H_1$ , the probability V accepts is at most:

$$\Pr_{r_1 \in F}[s_1(r_1) = H(r_1)] + \Pr_{r_2, \dots, r_\ell \in F}[\operatorname{Vaccepts}|s_1(r_1) \neq H(r_1)]$$
$$\leq \frac{d}{|F|} + \frac{d(\ell - 1)}{|F|} \leq \frac{d\ell}{|F|}.$$

# Costs of the Sum-Check Protocol

- Total communication is  $O(d\ell)$  field elements.
  - P sends  $\ell$  messages, each a univariate polynomial of degree at most d. V sends  $\ell 1$  messages, each consisting of one field elements.

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• P's runtime is at most:

 $O(d \cdot 2^{\ell} \cdot [time required to evaluate g at one point]).$
## First Application of Sum-Check: An IP For #SAT [LFKN]

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  - i.e., replace arphi with an **arithmetic** circuit computing extension g
    - Go gate-by-gate through  $\varphi$ , replacing each gate with the gate's multilinear extension.
    - $NOT(x) \rightarrow 1 x$
    - $AND(x, y) \rightarrow x \cdot y$
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Transforming a Boolean formula  $\varphi$  of size S into an arithmetic circuit computing an extension g of  $\varphi$ .

Note:  $deg(g) \leq S$ , and g can be evaluated at any input, gate by gate, in time O(S).

## Costs of #SAT Protocol Applied to g

• Let  $\varphi$  be a Boolean formula of size S over n variables, g the extension obtained by arithmetizing  $\varphi$ .

Rounds	Communication	V Time	P Time
n	P sends a degree S polynomial in reach round, V sends one field element in each round $\longrightarrow$ $O(S \cdot n)$ field elements sent in total.	• $O(S)$ time to process each of the <i>n</i> messages of P • $O(S)$ time to evaluate g(r) $\longrightarrow$ $O(S \cdot n)$ time total	P evaluates $g$ at $O(S \cdot 2^n)$ points to determine each message $\longrightarrow$ $O(S \cdot n \cdot 2^n)$ time in total.

- #SAT is a **#P**-complete problem.
  - Hence, the protocol we just saw implies **every** problem in **#P** has an interactive proof with a polynomial time verifier.
- It is not much harder to show that this in fact holds for every problem in **PSPACE** [LFKN, Shamir].

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  - When applying the protocols of [LFKN, Shamir] even to very simple problems, the honest prover would require **superpolynomial** time.
  - The #SAT prover took time at least  $2^n$ .
    - This seems unavoidable for #SAT, since we don't know how to even solve the problem in less than  $2^n$  time.
    - But we can hope to solve "easier" problems without turning those problems into #SAT instances.

## **Doubly-Efficient Interactive Proofs**

## **Doubly-Efficient Interactive Proof**

- A doubly-efficient interactive proof for a problem is one where:
  - V runs in time linear in the input size.
  - Pruns in polynomial time.



## A Second Application of the Sum-Check Protocol

# A Doubly-Efficient Interactive Proof for Counting Triangles

## **Counting Triangles**

- Input:  $A \in \{0,1\}^{n \times n}$ , representing the adjacency matrix of a graph.
- Desired Output:  $\frac{1}{6} \cdot \sum_{(i,j,k) \in [n]^3} A_{ij} A_{jk} A_{ik}$ .
- Fastest known algorithm runs in matrix-multiplication time, currently about  $n^{2.37}$ .
# **Counting Triangles**

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- Desired Output:  $\frac{1}{6} \cdot \sum_{(i,j,k) \in [n]^3} A_{ij} A_{jk} A_{ik}$ .
- The Protocol:
  - View *A* as a function mapping  $\{0,1\}^{\log n} \times \{0,1\}^{\log n}$  to *F*.
  - Recall that  $\tilde{A}$  denotes the multilinear extension of A.
  - Define the polynomial  $g(X, Y, Z) = \tilde{A}(X, Y) \tilde{A}(Y, Z) \tilde{A}(X, Z)$
  - Apply the sum-check protocol to *g* to compute:

$$\sum_{(a,b,c) \in \{0,1\}^{3\log n}} g(a,b,c)$$

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- Costs:
  - Total communication is  $O(\log n)$ , V runtime is  $O(n^2)$ , P runtime is  $O(n^3)$ .
  - V's runtime dominated by evaluating:  $g(r_1, r_2, r_3) = \tilde{A}(r_1, r_2) \tilde{A}(r_2, r_3) \tilde{A}(r_1, r_3).$

#### The GKR Protocol

# A General-Purpose Doubly-Efficient Interactive Proof

## General-Purpose Doubly-Efficient Interactive Proofs

• [GKR 2008] gave a doubly-efficient interactive proof for any function computed by an efficient **parallel** algorithm.



#### General-Purpose Doubly-Efficient Protocols

- Start with a computer program written in high-level programming language (C, Java, etc.)
- Step 1: Turn the program into an equivalent model amenable to probabilistic checking.
  - Typically some type of arithmetic circuit.
  - Called the **Front End** of the system.
- Step 2: Run an interactive proof or argument on the circuit.
  - Called the **Back End** of the system.







P starts the conversation with an answer (output).



V sends series of challenges. P responds with info about next circuit level.





Finally, P says something about the (multilinear extension of the) input.



of the) input.

V sees input directly, so can check P's final statement directly.

### Costs of the GKR protocol

- V time is O(n + D log S) where n is input size,
  D is circuit depth, and S is circuit size.
- Communication cost is  $O(D \log S)$ .



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  D is circuit depth, and S is circuit size.
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- P time is O(S).
  - A naïve implementation of the prover in the GKR protocol with take  $\Omega(S^4)$  time, where S is circuit size.
  - A sequence of works has brought this down to O(S), for arbitrary circuits! [CMT12, Thaler13, WBSTWW17, WTSTW18, XZZPS19]



## [RRR16] and Open Questions

## Another General-Purpose Doubly-Efficient Interactive Proof

- In the cloud computing scenario at the start of the talk, we really wanted the following:
  - 1. V asks P to run some computer program on her data.
  - 2. **P** proves that she correctly ran the program on the data.
- V should not do much more work than read the input.
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- The GKR protocol only achieves a linear-time for V parallelizable programs.

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  - So we can only hope to achieve a linear-time verifier for problems solvable in linear space.
  - [RRR16] come close to achieving the best we can hope for.

# [RRR16]

- Let f be a problem solvable in time T and space s. Then for any constant  $\varepsilon > 0$ , f has an interactive proof where:
  - V runs in time  $\tilde{O}(n + T^{\varepsilon} \cdot \text{poly}(s))$ .
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- In particular, if T = poly(n) and S is a small enough polynomial in n, then this is a doubly-efficient interactive proof system.
- The number of rounds is **constant**.
  - More precisely, it is  $\exp\left(\frac{1}{\varepsilon}\right)$ .

# **Open Questions (Theory)**

- Improve V's runtime in [RRR16] from  $\tilde{O}(n + T^{\varepsilon} \cdot \text{poly}(s))$ to  $\tilde{O}(n + \text{poly}(s, \log T))$ ? Maybe even  $\tilde{O}(n + s \cdot \log T)$ )?
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- Give an interactive proof for **batch-verification of NP statements**?
  - Under standard complexity assumptions, interactive proofs cannot be **succinct** [GH98, GVW01].
    - I.e., for a general **NP** relation, cannot do much better than just having the prover send the **NP** witness to the verifier.

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    - I.e., for a general **NP** relation, cannot do much better than just having the prover send the **NP** witness to the verifier.
  - Open: given *k* instances of the same **NP** problem, is there an interactive proof for verifying that the answer to all *k* instances is YES, with communication that grows sublinearly with *k*?

# A Parting Remark

- We've seen some fundamental limitations of interactive proofs.
  - V can't run in linear time for space-intensive problems.
  - They cannot be succinct.
  - They are interactive.
  - They are not publicly verifiable.

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  - V can't run in linear time for space-intensive problems.
  - They cannot be succinct.
  - They are interactive.
  - They are not publicly verifiable.
- All of these limitations can be addressed by combining interactive proofs with cryptography.
  - This yields succinct non-interactive arguments.
  - See tomorrow's talks.
- There are many practically-relevant open questions about the best way to combine interactive proofs with cryptography.

# THANK YOU!